This paper considers the impact of investment cost asymmetry on the value and optimal real option exercise strategies of¯rms under imperfect competition. Both¯rms have an opportunity to invest in a project enhancing (ceteris paribus) the pro¯t°ow. We show that three types of equilibria exist and derive critical levels of cost asymmetry separating the regions in which they prevail. The presence of strategic interactions leads to counter-intuitive results. First, depending on the level of asymmetry, a marginal increase in the investment cost of the¯rm with the cost disadvantage can increase this¯rm's own value. Second, such a cost increase can result in a decrease in value of the competitor. Moreover, we discuss the welfare implications of the optimal exercise strategies and show that the presence of identical¯rms can result in a socially less desirable outcome than if one of the competitors has a signi¯cant investment cost disadvantage. Finally, we prove that pro¯t uncertainty always delays investment, even in the presence of a strategic option of becoming the¯rst investor.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study the e®ects of imperfect competition on the optimal real option exercise strategies in a situation where the costs of exercising options di®er among¯rms. The need for a separate treatment of real, as opposed to¯nancial, options results from the non-exclusivity of the former. In particular, the optimal exercise decision of a¯rm competing in an oligopolistic market depends not only on the value of the underlying process but also on the actions undertaken by its competitor(s) (cf. Zingales [22] ). For example, the investment opportunity to set up the production line of personal cars in place of the existing assembly line may be represented as a real option to exchange a¯xed amount of money for an incremental stream of uncertain cash°ows. The cost of launching the production net of the scrap value of the assembly line can be viewed as the strike price of the option, whereas the increase in the expected present value of the stochastic pro¯t°ow corresponds to the underlying asset. The value of the investment opportunity, as well as the optimal exercise strategy associated with it, highly depends on the actions taken by the competing car manufacturer. Consequently, neither the value of the¯rm nor the optimal exercise strategy resembles any longer the situation where the¯rm has an exclusive option to invest.
The last decade's research results in a number of contributions dealing with the non-exclusivity of real options. The basic continuous-time model of strategic real option exercise under product market competition is presented by Smets [18] . He considers a duopolistic¯rm's decision to (costly) switch the production from a developed to an emerging economy where production costs are lower. Applications and extensions of the strategic real option exercise model include Grenadier [5] , [6] , Williams [21] , Lambrecht and Perraudin [12] , D ¶ ecamps and Mariotti [2] , Perotti and Rossetto [16] , and Mason and Weeds [15] , whereas Reinganum [17] , and Fudenberg and Tirole [4] provide the gametheoretical foundations within a deterministic framework.
1
In this paper we analyze the situation where two¯rms have an opportunity to invest in a pro¯t enhancing investment project and face di®erent (e®ective) investment costs. This framework, which allows for a departure from the unrealistic assumption that the duopolistic rivals are identical, re°ects a number of factors.
2 First, investment cost asymmetry is present when the¯rms have a di®erent access to the capital markets. In such a case, the cost of capital of a liquidity-constrained¯rm is higher than of its counterpart with an access to a credit line or with substantial cash reserves (Lensink, Bo and Sterken [13] ). Consequently, the investment cost of the¯rm facing capital market imperfections is higher as well. Moreover, cost asymmetry occurs when the¯rms exhibit a di®erent degree of organizational°exibility at implementing a new production technology. This°exibility, known as absorptive capacity (cf. Cohen and Levintal [1] ), measures the¯rm's ability to adopt external technologies, to assimilate to a changing economic environment, and to commercialize newly invented products. A higher absorptive capacity is therefore equivalent to a lower cost associated with an investment project. Di®ering real options embedded in the existing assets of the¯rms are another source of the investment cost asymmetry. This re°ects the possibility that the¯rms currently exploit two di®erent but equally e±cient technologies. After an arrival of a new invention it may appear that one of the existing technologies is more easily extendable than the other. Finally, the di®erence in the investment costs is often a consequence of purely exogenous factors, resulting e.g. from di®erent regulation. Those legal and¯scal factors are discussed later in the section concerning social welfare.
We consider the optimal real option exercise strategy of duopolistic rms already competing in a product market. Both¯rms have an investment opportunity enhancing (ceteris paribus) the pro¯t°ow. If one¯rm invests, the other¯rm's payo® is reduced. This is, for example, the case when the investment gives the¯rm the possibility to produce more e±ciently and thus cheaper, which leads to a higher market share. The¯rms di®er ex ante only with respect to the required sunk cost associated with the investment. Our framework most directly generalizes Smets [18] and Grenadier [5] , who restrict the analysis to a game between symmetric¯rms and of Huisman and Nielsen [10] , who consider a new market entry of asymmetric¯rms. This generalization results in the presence of three di®erent equilibrium strategies. First, when the asymmetry among¯rms is relatively small and so is the¯rst-mover advantage, the¯rms invest jointly. When the¯rst-mover advantage is su±ciently large, the lower-cost¯rm preempts the higher-cost¯rm. In the situation where both thē rst-mover advantage and asymmetry between¯rms are signi¯cant, the¯rms exercise their investment options sequentially and their investment timing do not a®ect each other directly. The two latter equilibria are also present in Perotti and Rossetto [16] .
Subsequently, we determine the¯rms' values and present welfare implications of the strategic option exercise. We¯nd that, when an increase in the investment expenditure of the higher-cost¯rm results in a switch from joint investment to preemption equilibrium, the value of both¯rms decrease. Moreover, in a preemption equilibrium, an increase in the higher-cost¯rm's investment expenditure results in increasing its value due to its commitment not to invest before the market is su±ciently large. Then the low cost¯rm knows that it could delay the investment without bearing the risk of being preempted. This investment delay raises the value of the higher cost¯rm. Using an example of a duopoly in which after the investment the¯rms can o®er a good with a higher quality, we show the relationship between the type of equilibrium and the level of consumer surplus. This analysis indicates that an equal access of competitors to a new technology (or a new market) may not be socially optimal. Finally, we analyze the impact of uncertainty on the optimal investment thresholds. Wē nd that the value of waiting option increases in the pro¯t volatility despite the presence of strategic interactions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3 contains the derivation of value functions and optimal investment thresholds. The discussion of the resulting equilibrium strategies is presented in Section 4 and the analysis of the impact of strategic interactions on the value of the¯rms is included in Section 5. In Section 6 we analyze the relationship between¯rms' investment strategies and social welfare whereas Section 7 discusses the impact of uncertainty on the timing of investment. Section 8 concludes.
Framework of the Model
Essentially, the basic framework of the non-strategic model of McDonald and Siegel [14] is adapted here, with the di®erence that we consider two¯rms rather than one. The two¯rms are risk neutral, compete in the product market, and realize a non-negative stochastic pro¯t°ow. 3 The uncertainty in each of thē rms' pro¯ts is introduced via a geometric Brownian motion x = fx t : t¸0g such that
where ® and ¾ are constants corresponding to the instantaneous drift and, respectively, to the instantaneous standard deviation, dt is the time increment and dw t is the Wiener increment. In order to obtain¯nite valuations, we impose ® < r, where r is a risk-free rate. The uncertainty in the pro¯t function is included in a multiplicative way. The instantaneous pro¯t of Firm i can be expressed as
where, for i; j 2 f0; 1g; i 6 = j :
D N i N j stands for the deterministic contribution to the pro¯t function, and it holds that
implies that the pro¯t of the¯rm that invests as¯rst exceeds ceteris paribus the initial (symmetric) pro¯t. Moreover, this investment leads to the deterioration of the pro¯t of the¯rm that did not undertake the project yet, i.e. D 0 0 > D 01 . Finally, the 'catch-up' investment made by the lagging¯rm enhances its pro¯t, so D 11 > D 0 1 , but, at the same time, it reduces the pro¯t of the¯rst mover, so that D 11 < D 10 : The last inequality implies that there are negative network externalities among the¯rms.
4
The investment opportunity is assumed to last forever and the structure of the associated payo® can only change as a result of the competitor's action. Therefore, the opportunity can be modelled as a perpetual American option with a payo® determined endogenously. Consequently, we denote the investment cost of Firm i; i 2 f1; 2g by I i : Without loss of generality I 1 is normalized to I; which is the investment cost of the low-cost¯rm, and I 2 is set equal to ½I; where ½ 2 [1; 1):
Finally, we assume that the initial realization of the process underlying both¯rms' pro¯ts is low enough, so that an immediate investment is not optimal. 5 
Value Functions and Investment Thresholds
There are three possibilities concerning the timing of Firm i's investment relatively to the decision of the competitor (Firm j ). First, Firm i may invest before Firm j does and, therefore, become the leader. Alternatively, Firm j may invest sooner and Firm i becomes the follower. Finally, Firm i and Firm j may invest simultaneously.
In this section we establish the payo®s associated with the three situations described above. As in the standard approach used to solve dynamic games, we analyze the problem backwards. First, we derive the optimal strategy of the follower, who takes the strategy of the leader as given. Subsequently, we analyze the decision of the leader. Finally, the case of joint investment is discussed.
Follower
Consider an investment decision of Firm i and de¯ne ¿ j to be the moment in time at which its competitor (Firm j) invests as the leader. Firm i will undertake the investment when pro¯ts are su±ciently large, i.e. when x t exceeds a certain threshold level denoted by x F i . Determining x F i is equivalent to¯nding the optimal option exercise strategy. At x t , where t¸¿ j , the value of Firm i as the 4 Mason and Weeds [15] allow for D11 > D10 to re°ect the positive network externalities that can arise among the competitors. In our setting (¯rms already compete in a product market) such an assumption would be more di±cult to justify. Moreover, D10 > D11 does not preclude the presence of positive network externalities among the¯rms' customers (for example, the pro¯ts generated by Microsoft Corp. in the o±ce software segment are not likely to be positively a®ected by technological improvements made by Corel). 5 Immediate investment is optimal in case of a su±ciently high initial realization of the stochastic process. Then mixed strategies equilibria can occur, as discussed for identical¯rms in Huisman and Kort [9] . follower equals
where
The realization x 
and¯(> 1) is the larger root of the quadratic equation
The¯rst integral in (3) corresponds to the present value of pro¯ts obtained before the investment is undertaken. The second part of (3) re°ects the present value of pro¯ts after the investment is made minus the associated sunk cost. The value of the¯rm as well as the optimal investment threshold can be calculated explicitly by applying the well-known standard dynamic programming methodology (see Dixit and Pindyck [3] ). By solving the Bellman equation with corresponding value-matching, smooth-pasting and no-bubbles conditions, we arrive at the following expression for the value of Firm i as the follower
The interpretation of (7) is as follows. The¯rst row is the present value of pro¯ts when the follower does not invest immediately. The¯rst term is the payo® in case the follower refrains from investing forever, whereas the second term is the value of the option to invest. The second row corresponds to the present value of enhanced cash°ows resulting from immediate investment minus its cost. 6 It is worth pointing out that the Marshallian investment threshold, x
, which is based on the static NPV criterion, equals
As explained in Dixit and Pindyck [3] , the di®erence between x re°ects the value of the option to wait, which raises the optimal threshold by factor¡ 1 > 1:
Leader
Following a similar reasoning as in the previous subsection, we determine the payo® of Firm i when it invests¯rst, thus Firm i is the leader. Then the value function of Firm i, evaluated at x ¿ i , where ¿ i is the moment of investing, equals
The¯rst two components of (8) correspond to the present value of the leader's pro¯ts realized until the moment of the follower's investment net of the leader's sunk cost. The second integral corresponds to the discounted perpetual stream of pro¯ts obtained after the investment of the follower.
Using the results of the follower problem, we can express the value of Firm i as the leader in the following way
The¯rst row of (9) is the net present value of pro¯ts before the follower made the investment minus the present value of future pro¯ts lost due to the follower's investment. The second row corresponds to the net present value of pro¯ts in a situation where it is optimal for the follower to invest immediately.
Simultaneous Investment
It is possible that the¯rms, despite the asymmetry in the investment cost, decide to invest simultaneously. The value function of Firm i investing at its optimal threshold simultaneously with Firm j is
and
Expression (10) is interpreted analogously to (3) and (8) . Consequently, the value of Firm i when the investment is made simultaneously equals
The second row equals the value of Firm i when the simultaneous investment is made immediately. In such a case, we denote the value of Firm i by V J i (¢) : From (12) it can be seen that x S i di®ers among the¯rms. As it is shown in the next section, this divergence does not preclude the simultaneous investment strategy.
Equilibria
There are three types of equilibria that can occur in the choice of strategies, namely the preemptive, sequential and simultaneous equilibrium. In this section we discuss the characteristics of each type of equilibrium and present the conditions under which each of them occurs.
Preemptive Equilibrium
The¯rst type of equilibrium we consider is the preemptive equilibrium. It occurs in the situation in which both¯rms have an incentive to become the leader, i.e. when the cost disadvantage of Firm 2 is relatively small. Therefore, Firm 1 has to take into account the fact that Firm 2 will aim at preempting Firm 1 as soon as a certain threshold is reached. This threshold, denoted by x P 21 , is the lowest realization of the process x t for which Firm 2 is indi®erent between being the leader and the follower. Formally, x P 21 is the smallest solution to
where » i (x t ) is de¯ned as
are given by (7) and (9), respectively. As a consequence, Firm 1 invests at
where x L 1 is Firm 1's optimal leader threshold equal to
7 For an elaborate treatment of this type of equilibrium the reader is referred to Fudenberg and Tirole [4] . Figure 1 shows an example of the¯rms' payo®s associated with being the leader, both investing at Firm 1's optimal simultaneous investment threshold and both investing immediately. The follower payo® of Firm i is set as a reference level. the value of Firm 2 as the leader is lower than the value as the follower, while to the right the opposite is true. Consequently, Firm 1 uses the fact that Firm 2 has no incentive to invest before x P 21 and preempts it by just an instant. For ½ tending to 1, i.e. when¯rms become symmetric, x P 21 gets closer to the Firm 1's preemption point, x P 1 , at which Firm 1 itself is indi®erent between being the leader and the follower.
The presence of cost asymmetry implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Firm 1 extracts a relative surplus from becoming the leader vs. being the follower, i.e.
Proof. The proof directly follows from the de¯nition of the preemption point and the observation that x
Sequential Equilibrium
The sequential equilibrium occurs when Firm 2 has no incentive to become the leader, i.e. when (14) does not have a real solution. In this case, Firm 1 simply maximizes the value of the investment opportunity, what always leads to investment at the optimal threshold x L 1 : In other words, Firm 1 acts as if it had exclusive rights to invest in a pro¯t-enhancing project. Figure 2 describes the¯rms' payo®s corresponding to the sequential investment equilibrium. From Figure 2 (right) it can be concluded that Firm 2 is never better o® by becoming the leader compared to being the follower. Therefore Firm 1 does not need to take into account the possibility of being preempted by Firm 2. As a result, Firm 1 is able to invest at its unconditional threshold, x L 1 (see Figure 2 , left diagram). At x L 1 the value of the investment opportunity smooth-pastes to the net present value of incremental bene¯ts from making the investment (cf. Dixit and Pindyck [3] ). As in the previous case, Firm 2 invests at its follower threshold x Proposition 2 There exists a unique value of ½ > 1; denoted by ½ ¤ , which is equal to
that separates the regions of the preemptive and the sequential equilibrium. For ½ < ½ ¤ Firm 1 needs to take into account possible preemption by Firm 2, whereas ½¸½ ¤ implies that¯rms always invest sequentially at their optimal thresholds.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, Proposition 2 states that there is a cut-o® level for the cost disadvantage of Firm 2 above which Firm 1 can act as a monopolist in exercising its investment option.
Simultaneous Equilibrium
Another type of equilibrium is the simultaneous (or: joint investment) equilibrium. In this case, the¯rms invest at the same point in time. Figure 3 depicts both¯rms' payo®s associated with the simultaneous equilibrium. In the simultaneous investment equilibrium one of the¯rms has to adopt a strategy that does not optimize its payo® unconditionally (since the optimal joint investment thresholds di®er). Since the optimal threshold of Firm 1 is lower than of Firm 2, the only candidate for a simultaneous investment threshold is x S 1 ; de¯ned by (12) . For simultaneous investment to occur, the payo® of Firm 1 associated with being the leader has to be lower than the payo® resulting from simultaneous investment. Otherwise, Firm 1 will invest either at x L 1 or at x P 2 (depending on the level of cost asymmetry). Moreover, Firm 2's follower threshold must be lower than x S 1 : In other words, Firm 2 has to¯nd it more pro¯table to respond to Firm 1's investment at x S 1 immediately than to wait. Otherwise, Firm 2 would invest as the follower at x F 2 : It turns out that wherever it is optimal for Firm 1 to invest simultaneously, Firm 2 prefers simultaneous investment to being the follower (see the proof of Proposition 3 below).
In the subsequent section we analyze under which circumstances the simultaneous equilibrium occurs.
Conditions for Equilibria
The occurrence of a particular type of equilibrium is determined by the relationship between the relative payo®s, which in turn depend on the level of cost asymmetry,¯rst-mover advantage and market parameters such as volatility, the growth rate and the interest rate. From Proposition 1 we already know the cut-o® value of the cost asymmetry that separates the preemptive and the sequential equilibrium. Now, we concentrate on determining the region in which the simultaneous equilibrium occurs. In order to do so, let us de¯ne
³ i (x t ) can be interpreted as the change in Firm i's value associated with refraining from an immediate (at x t ) investment as the leader in favor of the simultaneous investment strategy. If the minimum of
is larger than zero, the change is positive, and thus a simultaneous equilibrium occurs. In other words, the simultaneous equilibrium requires that Firm 1 is always better o® by investing jointly at its optimal threshold x S 1 compared to becoming the leader. 8 Otherwise, either the sequential or the preemption equilibrium occurs.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique value of ½¸1; denoted by ½ ¤¤ , which is equal to
that determines the regions of the simultaneous and the sequential/preemptive investment equilibria. For ½ < ½ ¤ ¤ the resulting equilibrium is of the joint investment type, whereas for ½¸½ ¤¤ the sequential/preemptive investment equilibrium occurs.
Proposition 3 implies that for a relatively high degree of asymmetry between rms (for a given set of D ij s and¯), simultaneous investment is not optimal and either a sequential or preemption equilibrium occurs. Moreover, there exists a set of parameter values for which simultaneous investment is not optimal even when the¯rms are symmetric. In this case ½ ¤ ¤ is equal to 1. We present an illustration of when the resulting equilibria occur in a two-dimensional graph. In Figure 4 we depict the investment strategies as a function of the¯rst-mover advantage, D 10 =D 11 , and the investment cost asymmetry, ½. 
Cost Asymmetry and Value of the Firm
In this section we discuss the impact of the degree of investment cost asymmetry on the value of each¯rm and, in particular, on the net present value (NPV) of the investment opportunities. We show that, in the presence of strategic interactions, the relationship between the magnitude of the investment cost asymmetry and the value of the¯rm is, in general, discontinuous and non-monotonic.
In the absence of strategic interactions among the¯rms the valueasymmetry relationship is relatively straightforward. An increase in the investment cost of Firm 2 a®ects its value via i) a higher present value of the investment expenditure that has to be incurred and ii) a delay in the optimal timing of investment which results in postponing the moment of the pro¯t°ow increase. Consequently, the value of Firm 2 decreases monotonically in ½. Conversely, the value of Firm 1 remains una®ected by a change in ½ since the¯rms do not interact with each other.
Introducing competition changes the way the asymmetry a®ects the values of both¯rms. In such a case, the value of Firm 2 is a®ected not only by an increase in its investment cost but also by the fact that Firm 1 can¯nd it optimal to revise its reaction curve in response to the changing characteristics of Firm 2. Consequently, the value of Firm 2 will be also a®ected by the change of Firm 1's investment timing in°uencing cash°ow of the former. We illustrate the impact of strategic interactions with an example in which parameter values are chosen in such a way that all three types of equilibria are possible (cf. Figure 4) . The¯rms' values resulting from their optimal strategies are depicted in Figure  5 below. The lowest degree of asymmetry between the¯rms corresponds to the simultaneous investment equilibrium. In the simultaneous equilibrium the outcome closely resembles the case where the strategic interactions are absent. A marginal increase in ½ does not a®ect the value of Firm 1 and has a negative impact on the value of Firm 2.
As ½ increases, the sequential investment becomes more attractive for Firm 1 because of the increasing Firm 2's follower threshold. This means that Firm 2 will invest later so that Firm 1's sequential investment pro¯t goes up. Consequently, for ½ exceeding ½ ¤¤ , Firm 1 would optimally invest at its leader threshold x L 1 . However, Firm 2 anticipates this and, since its leader value at x L 1 is larger than its follower value, it is willing to invest an instant before Firm 1 does. In such a situation the shift in Firm 1's reaction curve is discontinuous and a preemption equilibrium resulting in lower values of both¯rms occurs. The implication is that a marginal increase in the investment cost of Firm 2 that changes the equilibrium from simultaneous to preemptive, results in both rms' payo®s jumping downward. Once the¯rms are in the preemption region, the values of both¯rms increase in ½. The at¯rst sight surprising positive relationship between Firm 2's investment cost and its value is caused by the fact that increasing ½ makes Firm 2 a 'weaker' competitor. This implies that the preemption threat of Firm 2 declines in the investment cost asymmetry, so that x P 21 increases with ½. Therefore, Firm 1 invests later, and this is bene¯cial for the cash°ow of Firm 2 since it can enjoy a higher cash°ow for a longer period. In this case, the non-strategic and strategic e®ects work in the opposite direction and the latter dominates. As far as Firm 1 is concerned, its value increases because its investment threshold moves closer to x L 1 . Moreover, it bene¯ts from the delayed investment of Firm 2.
When the asymmetry between the¯rms reaches the critical level ½ ¤ , above which it is not optimal anymore for Firm 2 to become the leader, the sequential equilibrium occurs. Upon the switch to the sequential equilibrium the values of both¯rms jump upward. This jump is in both cases caused by the discontinuous change, from
In the sequential equilibrium region the changes in the¯rms' values result entirely from the sunk cost asymmetry and its impact on Firm 2's investment timing. Consequently, Firm 1 bene¯ts from the delayed investment of Firm 2 and the value of the latter decreases for the same reason as in the non-strategic case.
In order to provide better intuition about the nature of the non-monotonic relationship between the value of the¯rm, V i , and the investment cost asymmetry, ½, we decompose V i into three components. First, we calculate the expected value of discounted future pro¯ts in case no investment is made, which re°ects the value of assets in place, A=P i . Further, we derive the value of the¯rm's own investment opportunity given that the other¯rm does not invest, P V GO 
From Table 1a a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, we notice that the value attributed to assets in place does not change with the investment cost asymmetry. This is understandable since the existing production assets of thē rms are identical. Second, the value of Firm 1's investment opportunity rises with ½. This re°ects the fact that the growing competitive advantage allows Firm 1 to keep its investment strategy closer to the unconditional optimum, x L 1 (at which the value of P V GO O 1 in the example equals 18:15). Consequently, the only source of non-monotonicity is the interaction of Firm 2's investment decision with Firm 1's pro¯t (see P V GO C 1 in Table 1a ). When the cost-asymmetry becomes larger, i.e. when ½¸½ ¤ ¤ = 1:124, then Firm 1 has no longer an incentive to wait until the optimal simultaneous threshold is reached and is aiming at preempting Firm 2. As discussed above, the resulting preemption game deteriorates both¯rm's payo®s and, as a direct consequence, their values. Table 1b contains an analogous decomposition of the value of Firm 2. 
Upon analyzing Table 1b it can be concluded that increasing investment cost asymmetry has two e®ects on the value of Firm 2. First, it results in the drop in the value of Firm 2's investment opportunity, P V GO O 2 . This relationship is monotonic irrespective from the type of the prevailing equilibrium and results from the increase in the investment expenditure that has to be incurred. Second, it in°uences the way the competitor's option to invest, P V GO C 2 , a®ects the value of the¯rm. In the region of the preemptive equilibrium, i.e. for ½ 2 [1:124; 1:222], the value of Firm 2 lost due to the exercise of the investment opportunity by Firm 1, P V GO C 2 , is inversely related to the investment cost asymmetry. In other words, when Firm 2's cost becomes higher, the investment of its competitor has a smaller negative impact on its value since the competitor invests later. This is the result of the strategic e®ect of the marginal increase in investment cost, via P V GO C 2 , which is stronger than the direct e®ect of the increase in ½ on the net present value of the project, P V GO O 2 . So far, we considered the impact of a di®erence in the investment cost on the value of the¯rms. We have shown that there exists a non-monotonic and discontinuous relationship between the cost asymmetry and the¯rms' values resulting from the switches among the di®erent types of equilibrium strategies. In the next section we discuss the impact of ½ on social welfare by showing how particular types of strategies a®ect consumer surplus.
Welfare Analysis
In order to assess the desirability of policies a®ecting the¯rms' access to new market segments and technologies, we investigate how investment cost asymmetry a®ects social welfare. The investment cost that has to be incurred by the¯rm can be in°uenced by the regulator, for instance, via¯scal measures, governmental guarantees resulting in a lower cost of capital, a di®erent treatment of foreign vs. domestic investors, and the possibility of in°uencing the speed of knowledge spillovers. 9 Desirability of such a policy can be measured by the way it a®ects social welfare, which is the sum of the consumer surplus and the¯rms' values.
1 0 Since in the previous sections we already established the¯rms' payo®s, here we begin the analysis with deriving the consumer surplus. Subsequently, we discuss how this surplus is in°uenced by the¯rms investment strategies. After having done this, we are ready to present the relationship between the investment strategies and social welfare. Finally, we provide some conclusions.
In order to derive the consumer surplus, we specify the way investment is bene¯cial to the consumers. To do so, we introduce a simple setting in which after the investment Firm i is o®ering a product of quality b 1 > b 0 , where b 0 denotes the initial quality of the product. As long as the¯rms o®er the same quality b k , k 2 f0; 1g, they compete µ a la Cournot, whereas after making the investment¯rst, Firm 1 achieves a Stackelberg advantage in the di®erentiated product market. The Cournot outcome is restored after Firm 2 has invested. Then both¯rms compete in the market with a higher quality.
The market we consider has a continuum of consumers with utility function
where µ t;m is a time-varying consumer-speci¯c parameter that is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; A t ]; and p t;k l is the time t price of the product of quality b k while the product o®ered by the other¯rm is of quality b l . Parameter A t follows the geometric Brownian motion
where ®; ¾ and dw t are the same as in (1) . It is useful to observe (by applying Ito's lemma) that A 2 t can be replaced by x t since it exactly follows the process (1).
Let us derive the expressions for the instantaneous consumer surplus, denoted by cs t;k l , where again k and l relate to the quality o®ered by the¯rms. 9 For instance, lowering the cost of capital via a third-party guarantee is documented by Kleimeier and Megginson [8] . They¯nd that in the sample of 1,803 syndicated project¯nance loans an average reduction of the spread due to the guarantees amounts to 43 basis points. 10 Tirole [20] , Ch. 5-8, provides an excellent introduction to oligopoly theory.
We have to consider three cases. In the¯rst case only quality b 0 is provided. In the second case one¯rm provides quality b 0 and the other b 1 and,¯nally, both¯rms o®er b 1 : In the¯rst and third case maximizing the¯rm's pro¯ts and calculating the residual surplus (see Appendix) yields
where Q t = 2q t;k l is the total quantity o®ered, q t;k l and p t;k l are the equilibrium time t quantity and price of the product of quality b k , respectively, where the other¯rm's product is of quality b l , and P t;k (q) is a time t inverse demand function corresponding to the quality b k . The formulation of cs t ;10 (the second mentioned case) is slightly more involved and it corresponds to a Stackelberg equilibrium with second degree price discrimination. Consequently, cs t;1 0 consists of two components: the surplus of consumers purchasing the good of quality b 1 and the surplus of those who choose b 0 : Solving the Stackelberg game yields
To¯nd out in what way the consumer surplus is related to the¯rms' investment strategies, we analyze the changes in the consumer surplus across the equilibria. If the resulting equilibrium is of the simultaneous type the consumer surplus, CS 
where T S 1 is given by (11) . When the resulting equilibrium is of the preemption type, the consumer surplus, CS P t , amounts to 
The consumer surplus in the sequential equilibrium is the same as (26), with the exception that min
After taking into account that the¯rms invest later in the simultaneous equilibrium, a comparison of (25) and (26) enables us to formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under the preemptive/sequential equilibrium the consumer surplus is always larger than in the joint investment equilibrium.
Consequently, from the consumers' viewpoint, the situation in which thē rms invest simultaneously is undesirable. This is easy to understand since in this case the¯rms invest later so that during a longer period of time the product with a higher quality is not available. Now, let us investigate social welfare, which equals, as mentioned earlier, the consumer surplus plus the value of the¯rms. In order to relate the latter to the analyzed market, we can make the following substitution, where the expressions at the RHS of each equality result from the maximization of thē rms' pro¯ts:
For a particular example, the consumer surplus and the¯rms' values are depicted as functions of the asymmetry in the investment cost in Figure 6 . From Figure 6 it can be concluded that low asymmetry in the investment costs results in a relatively low consumer surplus and higher values of the¯rms. Increasing the asymmetry among the¯rms, such that the simultaneous equilibrium is superseded by the preemption equilibrium, leads to a downward jump in the¯rms' values and, at the same time, to an upward jump in the consumer surplus. As seen before, the decline in the¯rms' values mainly results from the need to incur the investment expenditure, I, earlier. The increase in the consumer surplus is the consequence of an earlier provision of the higher quality product. When the cost is large compared to the increase in the consumer surplus associated with higher quality, it is optimal from a welfare perspective to postpone the investment. Therefore, in such a case an increase in ½ leading to a switch from simultaneous to preemption equilibrium has a detrimental effect on welfare. Conversely, when the required sunk cost is relatively small, the resulting preemption equilibrium is socially desirable.
The impact of increasing ½ on social welfare is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 5 There exists a critical level of investment expenditure below which social welfare is always larger in the preemptive/sequential equilibrium than in the joint investment equilibrium.
Consequently, if the investment expenditure is small relatively to the consumer surplus, social welfare is highest under the preemption equilibrium. In this case, the loss in the¯rms' values resulting from the preemption game is outweighed by the e®ect on the consumer surplus of an earlier provision of the high quality product. This implies that in the case of a relatively low investment expenditure, a relative cost disadvantage of one of the competitors results in the strategies yielding a socially preferred outcome.
Conversely, a relatively high investment expenditure implies the social optimality of the simultaneous equilibrium. This results from the fact that the simultaneous equilibrium is associated with a later investment outlay. Since the increase in consumer surplus resulting from providing a higher quality product earlier is not su±cient to fully compensate for the higher present value of an early investment, postponing the investment is socially desirable. Therefore, in the presence of a high sunk cost of the project, investment strategies resulting in the simultaneous equilibrium maximize social welfare. This, in turn, implies that the cost asymmetry is not desirable.
We conclude that an equal access of two¯rms to a new market segment does not maximize the consumer surplus. Moreover, after taking into account the values of the¯rms, it is not always socially desirable. If the¯rms' investment costs are not excessively high, the presence of asymmetry among them yields a socially more desirable outcome.
However, it is important to notice that these conclusions do not carry over to the case where the¯rst-mover advantage is large, which would occur when the product quality di®erence is higher. Then, as illustrated in Figure 4 the preemption equilibrium prevails even if¯rms are symmetric. Consequently, from a welfare perspective, asymmetry is not desirable even if the investment is associated with a relatively low sunk cost.
Uncertainty and Investment Thresholds
From e.g. Dixit and Pindyck [3] it is known that in a non-strategic real options framework increasing uncertainty leads to a higher optimal investment threshold. As we show below, this observation also holds in strategic models as long as the¯rms' investment thresholds are solutions to the optimization problem. The follower's threshold, the leader's threshold in the sequential equilibrium, and the critical value triggering simultaneous investment satisfy this condition. Conversely, in the preemptive equilibrium the leader (Firm 1) does not invest at the threshold that solves its optimization problem, but instead it invests at the follower's (Firm 2's) preemption point.
From (5), (16) and (12) it is concluded that the optimal thresholds can be expressed as
where D af ter and D bef or e are the deterministic contributions to the pro¯t function corresponding to a given threshold. Consequently
i.e. the optimal follower's threshold, optimal leader's threshold and the critical value corresponding to simultaneous investment increase with uncertainty.
1
The impact of volatility on Firm 2's preemption point, x P 21 , at which Firm 1 invests, requires slightly more attention. Let us recall that x P 21 is the smallest root of » 2 (x t ) = 0: Consequently, we calculate the derivative of » 2 (x t ) with respect to the market uncertainty. The change of (15), calculated for Firm 2, resulting from a marginal increase in ¾ 2 can be decomposed as follows:
The derivative
measures the direct in°uence of uncertainty on the net bene¯t of being the leader. The product
re°ects the impact on the net bene¯t of being the leader of the fact that the follower investment threshold increases with uncertainty.
It can be shown that
Apparently, the joint impact of both e®ects is ambiguous. The¯rst e®ect is (32), which represents the simple value of waiting argument: if uncertainty is large, it is more valuable to wait for new information before undertaking the investment (Dixit and Pindyck [3] ) As we have just seen, this also holds for the follower. The implication for the leader of the follower investing later is that the leader has a cost advantage for a longer time. This makes an earlier investment of the leader more bene¯cial. This e®ect is captured by (33), which can thus be interpreted as an increment in the strategic value of becoming the leader vs. the follower resulting from the delay in the follower's entry. Obviously, the latter e®ect is not present in the monopolistic/perfectly competitive markets, where the impact of uncertainty is unambiguous. However, it is possible to show that the direct e®ect captured by (32) dominates, irrespective of the values of the input parameters.
Proposition 6 When uncertainty of the product market increases, the leader investment threshold increases as well.
Our conclusions concerning the relationship between the investment timing and uncertainty are consistent with recent empirical evidence. The negative investment-uncertainty relationship for¯rms operating in an imperfectly competitive environment is documented, for example, by Guiso and Parigi [7] .
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the impact on the¯rms' optimal investment strategies of the di®erence in the costs associated with their pro¯t-enhancing investments. Since the¯rms operate in an imperfectly competitive market, the profitability of each¯rm's project is a®ected by the other¯rm's decision to invest. We show that when the asymmetry among¯rms is relatively small and so is thē rst-mover advantage, the¯rms invest jointly. When the¯rst-mover advantage is signi¯cant, the lower-cost¯rm preempts the higher-cost¯rm. In the situation where the asymmetry between¯rms becomes su±ciently large, the¯rms exercise their investment options sequentially and their mutual decisions do not a®ect each other directly.
Asymmetry has remarkable implications for the value of both¯rms, since the value-asymmetry relationship for both¯rms is non-monotonic and discontinuous. Consequently, we obtain a number of counter-intuitive results. For reasonable parameter values, deepening the¯rm's competitive disadvantage due to a marginal rise in its irreversible cost may decrease the value of its competitor. This situation results when a switch from simultaneous to preemptive equilibrium occurs upon the marginal change in the cost asymmetry. Another interesting e®ect of strategic interactions is present when the¯rms are engaged in the preemption game. Then increasing the extent to which the¯rms is set at cost-disadvantage leads to an appreciation of its value due to the strategic e®ect on the competitor's investment timing.
Moreover, there are signi¯cant welfare e®ects of strategic interactions between the¯rms. In an example where the investment increases product quality, we show that the relationship between cost asymmetry and social welfare depends on the cost of investment. If it is relatively high and the¯rst-mover advantage is not too large, social welfare is maximized when none of the¯rms su®ers from competitive disadvantage. However, if the investment cost is low, an increase of the consumer surplus resulting from the early investment in the preemption equilibrium exceeds the loss of the¯rms' joint value associated with such an investment. Therefore, the preemption equilibrium, occurring when the costs su±ciently di®er, is in this case desirable. This observation allows for the conclusion that an equal access of competitors to a new technology or market segment may not be socially optimal.
Finally, the impact of uncertainty is analyzed. Despite the presence of strategic interactions, increasing uncertainty always results in a higher investment threshold. This holds not only for the optimal investment thresholds but also for the case when the lower-cost¯rm faces the threat of being preempted by its higher-cost opponent.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The sequential equilibrium occurs when Firm 2 has no incentive to invest as the leader. Formally, this requires that » 2 (x t ) is negative for all x t 2 [x 0 ; x L 1 ). Therefore, we are interested in¯nding a pair (x ¤ ; ½ ¤ ) that satis¯es the following system of equations (
In other words, we are interested in a point (x ¤ ; ½ ¤ ) in which Firm's 2 leader function is tangent to the follower function. After substituting (7) and (9) into (15), all de¯ned for Firm 2, and rearranging we obtain 8 > <
> :
After multiplying both sides of the second equation in (35) by
it from the¯rst equation, and rearranging, we obtain
Substituting (36) into the¯rst equation in (35) and (5) for x
Rearranging (37) leads to the expression (18) . In the remaining part of the proof, we demonstrate that ½ ¤ > 1: It holds that
Consequently
By substituting
and rearranging, we conclude that (39) is equivalent to
After observing that b > a and 
This completes the proof. Proof of Proposition 3. Firm 1 prefers simultaneous investment unless for some x t its leader payo®, V L 1 (x t ), exceeds the optimal joint investment payo®, V S 1 (x t ). Formally, simultaneous equilibrium occurs only if
. Therefore, we are interested in¯nding a pair (x ¤ ¤ ; ½ ¤ ¤ ) that satis¯es the following system of equations
In other words, we are interested in a point (x ¤¤ ;½ ¤ ¤ ) in which Firm's 1 simultaneous investment function is tangent to its leader function. After substituting (9) and (13) evaluated at (12) into (19) , all de¯ned for Firm 1, and rearranging, we obtain 8 > < > :
After multiplying both sides of the second equation in (46) by x ¤¤ ; subtracting it from the¯rst equation, and rearranging, we obtain
Substituting (47) into the¯rst equation in (46) and (12) and (5) for x S 1 and x
Given that we only consider the case that ½ ¤ ¤¸1 , rearranging (48) leads to the expression (20) .
In the remaining part of the proof we show that the optimality of the simultaneous investment for Firm 1 implies that Firm 2 is better o® by investing simultaneously as well. Consequently, we prove that as long as it is optimal for Firm 1 to invest simultaneously, Firm 2's follower threshold is always smaller than Firm 1's optimal joint investment threshold (since if this is true, then it is always optimal for Firm 2 to invest immediately when Firm 1 invests). First, we determine b ½ which solves
After substituting (5) for Firm 2 and (12) for Firm 1 into (49), and rearranging, we obtain
Now, we show that b ½ > ½ ¤¤ , i.e. that
holds. After substituting
and rearranging, we obtain that condition (51) is equivalent to
This implies
Let us denote z = , subtracting the value of consumer surplus in preemptive equilibrium from the value corresponding to the joint investment yields
e ¡rs (cs s; 10 ¡ cs s;00 ) ds
e ¡rs (cs s ;11 ¡ cs s;0 0 ) ds > 0:
An identical reasoning can be applied while comparing the simultaneous equilibrium with the sequential exercise strategy. Proof of Proposition 6. The di®erence of Firm 2's payo®s as the leader and the follower can be expressed as
We are interested in the direction in which uncertainty a®ects, x P 21 , i.e. the smallest root of (55). The derivative of (55) with respect to¯equals
It is straightforward to observe that for su±ciently small x t (56) is positive. This can be generalized into the statement that there exists x satisfying sgn @» 2 (x t ) @¯=
< :
1; x t 2 (0;x) ; 0; x t = x; ¡1; x t 2 ¡ x; x 
Since (in general) it is not possible to obtain an analytical formula for x P 21 , we evaluate the sign of the derivative (56) at such a realization of x t for which the corresponding sign is the same as at x P 21 . Consequently, we are interested in the realization of x t that satis¯es the following two properties » 2 (x ¤ ) < 0 =) » 2 (xt) < 0 8xt; and (58) 9x
Properties (57) and (59) imply that
The realization x ¤ equal to (cf. (36))
satis¯es (58) and (59). Property (58) can be veri¯ed by examining the de¯nition of x ¤ (cf. (34)) and by observing that @» 2 (x t ) @½ < 0:
Property (59) follows directly. Subsequently, we determine the sign of the derivative (56) at x ¤ :
Let us denote 
We prove that ' (½ ¤ ) > 0 in three steps. First, we change the variables and factorize the function ' (½ ¤ ), what yields the product of two factors: one with negative and one with unknown sign. Second, we show that the factor with the unknown sign is increasing in the relevant variable. Finally, we show that the value of the factor with a priori unknown sign approaches zero when the underlying variable approaches the upper limit of its domain. The last two steps imply that the sign of the analyzed factor is negative what is equivalent to the positive sign of ' (½ ¤ ). Consequently, we substitute (37) into (63) and obtain 
As an immediate result we get
+ ln
Factorization of (68) yields
Since it always holds that
we are interested in the sign of the second factor of (69). Therefore, we de¯ne e ' (p;¯)´(¯¡ 1)
Now, we determine the sign of the derivative of (71) calculated with respect to p. Consequently, we obtain e ' (p;¯)
This can be expressed as e ' (p;¯)
The¯rst factor of (73) is always negative. After the following substitution
the second factor of (73) can be expressed as
which is negative for every z 2 R ++ . This implies e ' (p;¯) @p > 0:
In the last step we show that 8¯lim p" 1 e ' (p;¯) = 0: The limit of (71) can be decomposed as
what yield the instantaneous pro¯t
The consumer surplus equals cs t; kk = 1 2
After Firm 1 achieves a Stackelberg advantage by investing, the prices and quantities equal The instantaneous pro¯ts are therefore equal
and the consumer surplus is cs t;10 = 1 2
The observation that A 2 t = x t allows for an immediate calculation of the consumer surplus in terms of (1) and for an identi¯cation of the deterministic contributions of the pro¯t functions.
